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It is crucial for content providers (CPs) to appear prominently on dominant online 
platforms in order to attract consumer demand. Apart from organic search results, 
content providers can obtain such prominence also in return for a monetary 
payment to the platform, e.g., in the form of sponsored search results. In this 
article, we investigate some of the economic consequences, if such payment can 
also be made with consumers’ data instead of money. Since data is non-rivalrous, 
the economic effects of data sharing for prominence are more complex and differ 
from paying for prominence. In a game-theoretic model we show that more 
consumer data will be collected as soon as CPs can obtain prominence on the 
platform. Whether the platform is more biased under a prominence-for-money 
scheme or under a prominence-for-data scheme depends on the marginal value 
of shared (non-exclusive) data. If this value is high, prominence-for-data will 
yield a higher platform bias, lead to more data collection by the CPs, and 
ultimately lower consumer surplus. Our results therefore bear important insights 
for the regulation of data-rich online platforms. 
Keywords: B2B data sharing, prominence on platforms, consumer data, data 
collection 
1 Introduction 
The European Commission recognizes online platforms as the “key gatekeepers of the 
internet” (European Commission, 2017, p. 7). For instance, 82% of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) state in a survey realized by the European Commission that they 
are reliant on search engines in order to favor their offered services and products 
(European Commission, 2017). The main purpose of online platforms is to organize 
and present the available content in a way that facilitates the consumers' discovery 
process for content (Krämer & Schnurr, 2018; Renda, 2015). However, this also implies 
 
 
that online platforms have the ability to steer consumers towards a specific content 
provider (CP) by giving that CP more prominence on the platform. Prominence is 
commonly granted in return for monetary payments to the platform (e.g., sponsored 
search results), usually elicited in the course of a position auction. However, platforms 
have also been accused to extract data from CPs (e.g., on consumer behavior), which 
helps them to optimize their business and to increase their data-induced market power. 
Often platforms induce CPs to share some of their data by offering them benefits on the 
platform or through access to some additional services (e.g., a social login or fulfillment 
service). In this paper, we specifically consider the scenario where a CP is offered more 
prominence on the platform (e.g. by biasing the search results in favor of that CP) in 
return for access to the CP's data. 
This scenario is exemplified by Google’s accelerated mobile pages (AMP) project, 
whose main purpose is to speed up mobile websites by hosting the content directly on 
Google’s services. However, this also has the (likely intended) effect that Google is 
able to attain the usage statistics of unaffiliated websites that are accessed via AMP. In 
return, AMP-enabled websites are placed more prominently in the mobile search 
results, e.g. by showing in the so-called carousel results or simply be being listed higher 
in the mobile search results page (because they load faster). Thus, in effect, AMP is a 
means to implement data for prominence (Jun et al., 2019). 
This relatively new phenomenon of business-to-business (B2B) data sharing as an 
alternative currency for CPs to gain prominence on online platforms has not been 
considered in the economic literature so far, despite its practical and political relevance. 
B2B data sharing reveals certain characteristics and implications which differ strongly 
from monetary payment. Most importantly, data is non-rivalrous which means that it 
can be duplicated effortlessly. This implies that the welfare effects of payments in data 
are far more complex since welfare is not simply shifted from the sender to the recipient 
of the payment. 
 
2 Related literature 
We contribute to the emerging literature on digital platform ecosystems, which is 
reviewed more generally by De Reuver et al. (2018) as well as Hein et al. (2020). More 
specifically, we consider how the value generated by data is distributed between the 
platform and the complementors (see Tiwana (2015)) for a review. Our paper especially 
contributes to two literature branches – payment for prominence and data-driven 
markets.  
 
First, payment for prominence on online platforms has previously been considered in 
various contexts – i.e. usability, welfare effects and policy regulations. Receiving 
prominence on platforms is crucial for content providers to obtain consumer demand 
(Krämer & Zierke, 2020). For instance, Ursu (2018) shows that a higher ranking and 
thus, more prominence significantly increases the consumers’ click through rates. 
Krämer and Schnurr (2018) review the literature concerning both the strategic and the 
 
 
welfare effects of paying for prominence in order to investigate whether there is a need 
for a platform neutrality regulation. On the one hand, if CPs compete in prices, 
sponsored search on rankings results in increased prices and thus, a lower consumer 
surplus. Although the platform’s and the CPs’ profits increases, the CPs may end up in 
a prisoners' dilemma and hence, the total welfare is likely to be smaller under payment 
for prominence (Armstrong & Zhou, 2011; Zhou, 2011). On the other hand, if CPs 
compete in qualities, content providers which offer a higher quality also have an higher 
willingness-to-pay for prominence on the platform and hence, prominence serves as 
signals for the CPs’ content quality and increases the consumer surplus and the total 
welfare (Athey & Ellison, 2011; Chen & He, 2011; de Cornière & Taylor, 2020; Krämer 
and Zierke, 2020). Therefore, consumers are not necessarily worse off under a 
prominence for data scheme. In particular, De Cornière and Taylor (2019) study the 
effects of biased intermediation for a, with the platform, integrated CP. Depending on 
whether the seller’s and the consumers’ payoffs are conflicting or congruent, a bias can 
be beneficial for consumers.  
 
Second, several theoretical papers model competition in data-driven markets. For 
instance, Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017) analyze under which conditions duopolies are 
stable and when monopolies emerge in data-driven markets. De Cornière and Taylor 
(2020) examine under which conditions a firm with a better (worse) data set generates 
more (less) consumer utility in data-driven mergers or consumers privacy concerns 
regarding data disclosure. Gu et al. (2019) as well as Ichihashi (2019) model 
competition of data intermediaries explicitly. One of their main findings is that the 
economic profits of a firm are the greater, the more data is exclusively available to that 
firm. We built on their results and take these findings as input for our model. De 
Cornière and de Nijs (2016) analyze the impact of disclosing consumer information on 
product prices. In their model an online platform decides whether to give advertisers 
access to the platform’s consumer information prior bidding on the platform’s 
advertising slots but before learning the consumers’ information. While there is a 
burgeoning literature on digital platforms, payment-for-prominence, and data-driven 
markets, respectively, to the best of our knowledge, the economic impacts of 
prominence-for-data schemes have not been studied in the literature so far. 
3 Model 
We develop a game-theoretic model in order to analyze the economic implications of 
data-for-prominence schemes in the platform economy. In our model, a monopolistic 
platform can decide to offer one of two CPs more prominence on the platform (e.g., by 
biasing the search results) in return for a share of the CP’s data. The platform can steer 
consumers to one of the two CPs by giving it prominence on the platform, e.g., by 
ranking it systematically higher in the search results everything else being equal. In this 
case, we will say that the platform has a 'bias'.  
Both CPs compete for the consumers’ attention, and they offer their content for free, 
but collect data from the users that consume their content.  
 
 
The consumers single-home and after entering the platform, they choose which of the 
two CPs they want to visit. The consumer demand of each CP depends on three main 
factors. Everything else being equal, consumers prefer the CP which (1) collects less 
data about them, and (2) which offers content that is closer to the consumer's individual 
preference; but (3) the CP's demand depends also on the platform's bias.  
Moreover, the CPs compete with the platform on the data market (e.g., the market for 
targeted advertising, selling data analytics services or simply as a data broker) in which 
they can exploit the consumer data acquired by offering their consumer-facing service. 
While we abstract from modelling competition in the data market explicitly, we borrow 
the central insight from explicit models of competition data intermediaries (Gu et al., 
2019; Ichihashi, 2019) that the economic profits of a firm are the greater, the more of 
the firm's data is exclusively available to that firm. The platform and the CPs can reap 
higher profits in the data market, the more user data they possess. However, due to the 
non-rivalry of data, competition in the data market intensifies as more firms possess the 
same data sets. This enables us to examine the trade-offs the CPs face when sharing 
data in return for prominence, what impact the substitutability of the acquired data has 
on data sharing and the welfare effects. 
 
We compare three scenarios. First, a baseline scenario where the platform can choose 
to bias the presentation in favor of one of the CPs, but does not receive a compensation 
in money or data in return. Second, a prominence-for-data scheme, where the platform 
offers to bias the presentation in favor of one CP in return for a share of that CP’s data. 
Third, a counterfactual prominence-for-money scheme, where the platform offers to 
bias the presentation in return for a financial payment, but where the platform does not 
receive additional data from the CP. 
 
We analyze the scenarios by backwards induction in order to determine the subgame-
perfect equilibria. Thereby, the timing is as follows: In Stage 1, the platform chooses a 
prominence offer by selecting a level of bias and, depending on the scenario, a 
compensation in terms of data or money. In Stage 2, the CPs decide whether to accept 
the prominence offer. In Stage 3, the CPs choose their data collection level, and in Stage 
4, the consumers decide which CP to access and demands are realized. 
4 Findings 
We find that the platform has no incentive to bias the presentation in favor of one CP, 
if it does not receive a compensation in return. An unbiased platform maintains the 
highest possible level of competition for consumers between the CPs, and induces the 
CPs to limit the amount of data that they collect from consumers. On the one hand, this 
is good for the platform itself, especially if the platform has already access to large 
consumer data sets, because it avoids that CPs can collect more data on consumers 
themselves, which would lower the average value of the platform's data set. On the 
other hand, an unbiased platform also preserves consumers' privacy in the best possible 
way, and avoids that some consumers may be steered away from the content that would 
 
 
offer them the highest utility. Therefore, an unbiased platform always provides the 
highest possible consumer surplus.  
Introducing a bias would weaken the competition between CPs and allow them to 
collect more data from consumers. This in turn, intensifies the competition with the 
platform on the data market. 
However, we can also show that if the platform can be compensated for giving 
prominence to a CP, either through a prominence-for-money or prominence-for-data 
scheme, then this provides the platform with additional incentives to introduce a bias. 
The bias can either be higher under a prominence-for-money scheme or a prominence-
for-data scheme, depending in the marginal value of non-exclusive data.  
If the value of shared (non-exclusive) data is low, the platform has a larger incentive to 
bias under a prominence-for-money scheme, and will also make larger profits under 
this scheme. However, if the marginal value of shared data is high, then a prominence-
for-data scheme leads to a higher platform bias, and a higher platform profit. However, 
for consumers a larger platform bias is always welfare decreasing, because it weakens 
the competition between CPs, and leads to collection of more data, and hence higher 
privacy costs for consumers. 
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